Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Is bopping ever justified?

A rabbit finds itself hopping through the forest. In order to amuse himself, he begins scooping up the field mice that he finds along the way, and bops them on the head. Is this a right action? Is it justified?

But consider the following alterations to the example: The rabbit is hopping through the forest. In order to amuse himself, he picks up the occasional field mouse. The mouse, being a rather vicious animal, bites the rabbit on the paw. So, in retaliation (and perhaps for his own safety), the rabbit bops the field mouse on the head. Is this now a right action? Is the action justified?

Let us consider yet another possibility: Unbeknownst to anyone (including rabbits and non-rabbits), the field mice have been gathering to plot a massive attack against the rabbits. While field mice are considerably smaller than rabbits, one at a time, they are helpless against the enormous rabbit. However, they, at some point, realized that if they were to all join together, their masses could beat the rabbits rather easily. An agent, call him Bunny Foo-Foo, does not know of the master plan of the field mice. As he hops through the forest, as he usually does, he begins picking up the field mice and bopping them on the head. The number of field mice that he bops before his actions are stopped by the sovereign (call her the Blue Fairy if you will), is sufficient to hold of the attack of the mice (at least until they produce more mice). As Bunny Foo-Foo has now single-handedly saved the rabbits from complete and total destruction, it seems he has now done a good thing. Is the action now right? Even if Bunny Foo-Foo was not privilege to this knowledge? Why or why not?

Discuss.

Wednesday, July 11, 2007

Folk-psychological belief ascription and idiolectal translations

I wrote a paper on Quinean empathy qua idiolectal translation manual selection tool recently, and I think that I may be onto something, but Falk seemed to think differently. I submit to you some preliminary thoughts about this topic, and any feedback would be greatly appreciated.
I think that using empathy as a way to help select a (so-to-speak) idiolectal translation manual--being a "manual" that allows one to properly take words or phrases used in the lexical public language and effectively translate them into the idiolect of the original speaker--that will allow us to avoid what seems to be a common problem in the philosophy of language; namely the problem of identity when a speaker is unaware that two terms (or proper names) refer to the same object, makes contradictory statements (not knowing of the contradiction) and a third party seeks to report those beliefs having full knowledge of the co-reference and thus the third party is doomed to contradiction in a way that the original speaker is not. This should bring to mind Frege's "morning star-evening star," or for those of you in Falk's D&B class, his whole book.
Anyway, that's the problem... Here's what I think one can do:

I attempt to show that using empathy may provide us a sort of “back-door” into understanding the idiolect of another person. If we are able to detect idiosyncratic tendencies of another’s language (both verbal and non-verbal) then it may lend credence to our abilities to, so to speak, choose the correct idolectal translation guide and better understand another person. If this is possible, it will provide us a basis to maneuver around a seeming paradox in ascribing rational-but-false beliefs to another person; namely that we ultimately end in self-contradiction. This is a familiar problem to the philosophy of mind, but is posed decisively in Stephen Schiffer’s article, “A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports.” The confutation of this problem may not be, necessarily a solution, as much as a way to show that it really is not a problem after all.
I will not provide the entirety of the paper (as that would be a ludicrous abuse of this venue) but I will provide some key definitions to help you help me, I hope.
Empathy, as I shall use it, I mean to be the detection of idiosyncratic behavior (both verbal and non-verbal) and generating the ability to project ourselves into the position of the speaker-actor. Following Falk, I will refer specifically to empathy as a way to understand that attitude, as well as, behavior of another. Empathy, while not being entirely conscious at all times, is not an ability that we have with everyone, all the time. It is, however, imperative to learn a public language, and so is something that we have naturally.
(This is much like the definition outlined by Quine in Pursuit of Truth, §16 (pg. 43) where he states, “We judge what counts as witnessing the occasion… by projecting ourselves into the witness’s position.”) It is important to note, however, that I do not limit my use of empathy to observation sentences in terms of concrete objects; I extend this also to empathy of attitudes and behaviors.
Idiolect I take to be a fairly common term denoting a pseudo-public language that is personal to an individual. By ‘pseudo-public’ I mean that it is a personal reflection of a lexical public language that I happen to prescribe to but that is not exclusive to me. I borrow this notion from Alexander George who described idiolects as, “not something essentially private: you and I could have the same idiolect… An idiolect is idiosyncratic in being that about which a particular speaker at a particular time has some knowledge and not in being something about which only one person could have knowledge.”
In his paper, “Whose Language Is It Anyway? Some Notes on Idiolects,” George explains the idiolect in a way I find quite congenial. He says, “My idiolect is an object about which I have beliefs, in particular those beliefs I possess qua linguistic being. In this respect, one’s idiolect can be compared, for example, to the natural number series… These are abstract structures about which one can have beliefs, some true, some false.”
translation manual is a useful tool that everyone has at their disposal. What I mean by this is that with each person subscribing to an idiolect, there must be some way to get at how the idiolect applies to the public language. Think about this manual in the same way that one would think about one for a foreign language.
Alright. Go to town.

Monday, June 04, 2007

The Value of Possible Universes

I wanted to see if anybody else had any thoughts about this topic. I did my paper for Phil of Religion on this and it's something I've always wondered about ever since I was little. It's from page 237 and 263 of Quentin and Craig's book Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. I copied this directly from my paper...

For a brief moment during the debate as to whether God’s omni-benevolence constrains It to create animate universes over inanimate universes, both Smith and Craig appeal to differing intuitions regarding the value of animate vs. inanimate universes. Thus, while Smith claims that ‘we must take into account not only that an inanimate universe is better than no universe but also that an animate universe is better than an inanimate universe,’ Craig disagrees with this claim when he states that ‘we can imagine innumerable many worlds of the former [inanimate] type which would exceed in goodness worlds of the latter [animate] type (for example, inanimate worlds of great beauty compared with animate worlds filled with unredeemed and gratuitous evil).’

I defended two theses in the paper, the first was that
the worst possible existence or universe is better than non-existence or no universe, and the second was that the worst possible animate existence or universe is better than the best possible inanimate existence or universe. So I disagreed with Craig on the value of possible universes, but I did agree with him that God is not constrained to create animate over inanimate universes, even though I think that animate universes are a better kind of universe than inanimate ones, but that is a blog post for another time. I just want to know what you guys think about my two theses, about the value of these possible universes or non-universe against each other. I am more than intrigued to hear any and all responses!